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Abstract 
Choosing the right counterpart can have a significant impact on negotiation success. 
Unfortunately, little research has studied such negotiation counterpart decisions. Three studies 
examined the influence of past negotiations on preferences to negotiate again with a counterpart. 
Study 1 found that the more favorable a past negotiated agreement the stronger the preference to 
negotiate with the counterpart in the future. Moreover, this relation was mediated through liking 
of the counterpart. Study 2 manipulated the difficulty of achieving a favorable agreement in the 
negotiation and found a significant effect of this situational factor such that subsequent 
counterpart preferences were less favorable when the negotiation was difficult. Similar to Study 
1, this effect was mediated through liking of the counterpart. Study 3 examined the possibility of 
debiasing negotiator preferences from the biasing influence of situational characteristics by 
providing relevant information about the negotiation situation. Replicating the results of Study 2, 
negotiation difficulty affected counterpart preferences before additional information was given or 
when irrelevant information was given. However, once negotiators received relevant information 
on the negotiation situation, the effect of negotiation difficulty disappeared. Theoretical and 
practical implications are discussed. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: interpersonal liking; negotiation; negotiation bias; negotiation counterpart 
decision; negotiation counterpart preference; negotiation preparation 
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People frequently negotiate, both at work – with superiors, peers, subordinates, and customers – 
and in their private lives – with spouses, children, and friends. As such, being good at negotiating 
can provide a variety of benefits. Not surprisingly, researchers and practitioners alike have been 
trying to uncover the factors that lead to successful negotiations. In addition to the behaviors at 
the “bargaining table”, authors have emphasized the paramount importance of negotiation 
preparation for achieving one’s negotiation goals (Lewicki, Barry, Saunders, & Minton, 2003; 
Raiffa, 2002; 1982; Thompson, 2001). 
Negotiation preparation consists in the variety of activities undertaken before the 
negotiators actually sit down at the bargaining table, such as clarifying one’s goals, setting one’s 
aspirations as well as reservation price, getting information about potential negotiation 
counterparts, and laying out one’s negotiation strategy (Lewicki et al, 2003). Negotiation 
preparation also includes searching for potential negotiation counterparts and then deciding with 
whom to negotiate (Reb, 2007; Raiffa, 2002, p. 200). Unfortunately, relatively little research has 
addressed how negotiators make such negotiation counterpart decisions (for exceptions see 
Barry & Oliver, 1996; Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, Moag, & Bazerman, 1999). To help address 
this gap in the literature, the present paper examines the influence of past negotiations on 
individuals’ preferences to negotiate with a counterpart again in the future.  
In the following, I will first elaborate more fully on the concept of negotiation 
counterpart decisions. Next, Study 1 tests the hypotheses that economic gain from past 
negotiated agreements leads to stronger preferences to negotiate with a counterpart again in the 
future, and that this relationship is mediated through liking. Study 2 then examines whether 
counterpart preferences are more favorable following a negotiation that was easy (because of a 
wide bargaining zone) rather than difficult (because of a narrow bargaining zone). Finally, Study 
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3 attempts to debias negotiators’ counterpart preferences by providing information about the 
difficulty of the negotiation situation. 
Negotiation Counterpart Decisions 
In many situations, such as which applicant to hire, with which company to form a joint 
venture, from whom to purchase supplies for production, or from whom to buy a car, more than 
one counterpart is potentially available for negotiations. For reasons such as lack of time and 
resources, it is typically not possible to negotiate with all potential counterparts; a decision needs 
to be made with whom, and with whom not, to negotiate. Even when the pool of potential 
counterparts is small enough so that it would be possible to negotiate with all of them, at the 
least, a negotiator needs to decide on an order in which to negotiate with the available 
counterparts. And, at the most basic level, the negotiation counterpart decision is about either 
selecting or rejecting a specific counterpart. 
Selecting the right counterparts and rejecting the wrong ones can have a significant 
impact on negotiation success (Reb, 2007; Tenbrunsel et al, 1999). For example, the probability 
of achieving one’s negotiation goals often differs considerably across potential counterparts. 
Counterparts differ in the resources they have to offer, in their negotiation styles and in many 
other respects. Negotiators can benefit by choosing counterparts that are compatible in terms of 
values, resources, style etc. (Raiffa, 2002). Further, negotiating is a costly activity drawing on 
limited resources such as time, attention, and money. While negotiating with the wrong 
counterpart need not lead to a suboptimal agreement as the negotiation can be broken off without 
reaching agreement, scarce resources are still being used up during the process. Moreover, 
negotiating with the wrong counterpart can be emotionally frustrating because of a lack of fit 
between the negotiators. Thus, it is important that we understand better how negotiators form 
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preferences about potential counterparts. 
Past Outcomes and Negotiation Counterpart Preferences 
One might expect that negotiators choose among potential counterparts using an explicit 
and forward-looking analysis of the expected utility of negotiating with that party in order to 
achieve the best possible negotiation outcome. Such a rational process would require negotiators 
to collect and analyze all available information about potential counterparts and then use this 
information to calculate the expected utility of negotiating with these counterparts. However, 
research has shown that individuals tend to follow cognitively much less demanding decision 
processes based on heuristics (e.g., Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), conditioning, and learning from past 
experience (e.g., Erev & Barron, 2005; Erev & Roth, 1998; Estes, 1964).  
Consistent with this view of individuals as, at best, boundedly rational (March & Simon, 
1958; Neale & Bazerman, 1991), Tenbrunsel et al (1999) provided evidence that negotiators use 
a kind of “relationship heuristic” (p. 278) when selecting from a pool of potential counterparts. 
In their studies, negotiators were given the opportunity to first interact with several counterparts 
and then reach an agreement with only one of them. Results suggest that negotiators were more 
likely to enter into agreements with parties they knew relatively well (“strong ties”). 
Interestingly, these agreements were on average worse than agreements between negotiators not 
connected through prior relationships, suggesting that the use of this heuristic process reduces 
negotiation success.  
These findings are interesting because they suggest that the mere presence of past 
experiences with another party can affect negotiation counterpart preferences. However, I expect 
that, in addition to the presence or absence of a relationship, the quality of any past interaction 
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also matters for counterpart preferences. Moreover, the quality of past interaction might be 
especially important when the past experience was actually a negotiation (rather than a different 
type of interaction, say a small-talk at a dinner party). Past negotiation experiences can provide a 
source of learning about the other party and serve as easily available cues to quickly judge the 
value of a potential counterpart for future negotiations. Specifically, negotiators might use some 
form of a “win-stay, lose-change” heuristic (Kelley, Thibaut, Radloff, & Mundy, 1962; 
Thorndike, 1911): If the past negotiation was successful, negotiate again with the counterpart; if 
the past negotiation was unsuccessful, search for a new counterpart. Such a heuristic would 
predict a positive relation between past negotiation quality and preference to negotiate with the 
counterpart again.1 
While negotiation quality can be assessed in a variety of ways, the economic gain a 
negotiator derives from an agreement is likely to be one of the most salient indicators of 
negotiation quality. After all, reaching a favorable economic outcome is often the reason to enter 
into a negotiation in the first place. Because salient cues tend to have a strong effect on 
judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), Study 1 focuses on the relation between the economic 
gain derived from a past negotiated agreement and subsequent negotiation counterpart 
preferences. I expect that the more favorable a past negotiated outcome, the higher the preference 
to negotiate again with the other party in a subsequent negotiation. 
Hypothesis 1: Economic gain from a past negotiated agreement is positively related to 
preference to negotiate again with the counterpart in a future negotiation.  
The Role of Interpersonal Liking in Negotiation Counterpart Preferences 
 Hypothesis 1 is rather intuitive. One interesting question concerns the process through 
which past outcomes influence counterpart preferences. I propose that the influence of past 
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outcomes on subsequent counterpart preferences works to a significant extent through liking of 
the other party. Indeed, research has shown a profound influence of liking on preferences 
(Zajonc, 1980). In the negotiation context, liking has been found to lead to more positive 
perceptions of the counterpart, especially when combined with familiarity (Druckman & 
Broome, 1991). Liking can serve as a simple heuristic through which negotiators arrive at 
judgments and preferences (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Thus, negotiators might rely to a 
substantial degree on their “gut feelings” to make decisions about negotiation counterparts 
(although that the relative influence of conscious strategy and gut feelings on such decisions may 
differ and depend on a variety of factors such as the affective state of the negotiator, cf. Barry & 
Oliver, 1996). How much one likes another party provides an easily available cue to evaluate 
that party. Thus, despite the strategic, mixed-motive nature of the negotiation situation, I predict 
that interpersonal liking significantly influences negotiation counterpart preferences. 
Hypothesis 2: Liking of a counterpart is positively related to preference to negotiate 
again with the counterpart in a future negotiation. 
This prediction is entirely consistent with the argument concerning the influence of past 
outcomes on subsequent counterpart preferences. Specifically, liking can be caused by feeling 
rewarded from another person (Byrne, 1971; Lott & Lott, 1974). Therefore, a favorable 
negotiation outcome may lead a negotiator to like the counterpart more. This increased liking 
then leads to a stronger preference to negotiate with the other party again. In other words, the 
relation between the favorability of a negotiated agreement and subsequent counterpart 
preference may be mediated through liking. 
Hypothesis 3: Liking mediates the relation between economic gain from a past negotiated 
agreement and preference to negotiate again with the counterpart. 
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Study 1 was designed to test Hypotheses 1 to 3. 
Study 1 
Method 
Overview, Design, Procedure, and Participants 
Participants performed a simulated recruitment negotiation between a job candidate and a 
recruiter. Participants were randomly assigned to dyads and roles (candidate or recruiter) and 
were given 45 minutes to complete the negotiation exercise. They were encouraged to take the 
exercise seriously. Upon completion of the simulation the negotiators together filled out an 
agreement form on which they calculated the number of points the agreement was worth to them. 
Then, they completed by themselves a post-negotiation questionnaire measuring negotiation 
counterpart preferences and interpersonal liking.  
Seventy-six undergraduate students at a Southeast Asian university participated in this 
simulation as part of a course assignment.  
Materials and Measures 
  Negotiation. The exercise was an integrative negotiation between a job candidate and a 
recruiter that involved eight issues, including two distributive issues (salary, starting date), four 
integrative issues (bonus, vacation time, moving expense coverage, insurance coverage) and two 
common value issues (job assignment, location). Together with the negotiation and role 
instructions, negotiators received a payoff table that allowed them to calculate the number of 
points (i.e., the economic gain) derived from any possible agreement. They were instructed to try 
to maximize the number of points they received from the agreement. At the end of the 
negotiation, they calculated their score, which was used as independent variable.  
  Negotiation counterpart preference. Two items measured negotiators’ preferences for the 
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other party as a counterpart in future negotiations: “I would like to negotiate again with my 
counterpart in a negotiation exercise like this one”, and “I would like to negotiate again with my 
counterpart in a negotiation like this but for real outcomes.” Both measures were assessed with a 
7-point Likert scale (7: strongly agree, 1: strongly disagree). Because the reliability of this scale 
was relatively low (r = .49, α = .66), I also performed all analyses with the single items. All 
results were replicated with each item. Thus, for brevity, I report below analyses on a counterpart 
preference index that averages the two variables. 
  Interpersonal liking. Negotiators’ interpersonal liking of the counterpart was measured 
with the following item on a 7-point Likert scale (7: strongly agree, 1: strongly disagree): “Based 
on my experience in this negotiation I like my negotiation counterpart.” 
Results 
Economic Gain and Subsequent Counterpart Preferences 
As expected, the economic gain derived from a negotiated agreement significantly 
predicted subsequent counterpart preferences, r = .32 (see Table 1 for all means, standard 
deviations, and correlations). The more favorable the agreement reached, the stronger was the 
preference to negotiate with the counterpart again in the future. These results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. 
The Role of Interpersonal Liking 
I next examined the role of interpersonal liking in determining counterpart preferences in 
general, and as a mediator of the relation between past outcome and subsequent counterpart 
preference in particular. First, liking predicted counterpart preferences, r = .51. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, the more negotiators liked their counterparts based on the past negotiation 
experience, the more did they want to negotiate with them again in the future. To test for 
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mediation (Hypothesis 3), I followed the widely-used procedure described in Baron and Kenny 
(1986). First, economic gain predicted the hypothesized mediator, liking, r = .26. The more 
favorable the negotiated agreement, the more negotiators liked their counterpart. Second, as 
reported above, both the independent variable, economic gain from the negotiated agreement, 
and the presumed mediator, liking, predicted the dependent variable, negotiation counterpart 
preference. Next, when predicting negotiation counterpart preferences simultaneously from past 
economic gain and interpersonal liking, liking continued to be a significant predictor, β = .46, 
t(73) = 4.51, p < .001, but past gain became insignificant, β = .20, t(73) = 1.91, ns. Finally, a 
Sobel (1982) test for mediation showed that the indirect, or mediational, path from economic 
gain through liking to counterpart preference was significant (z = 2.06, p < .05). Thus, consistent 
with Hypothesis 3, liking mediated the relation between the gain derived from a past agreement, 
and preference to negotiate with a counterpart again in the future. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Discussion 
Study 1 provided evidence for the influence of past negotiation outcomes on subsequent 
negotiation counterpart preferences. The higher the gain derived from a negotiated agreement, 
the stronger an individual’s preference to negotiate again with the other party in the future. 
Interpersonal attraction also predicted counterpart preferences such that the more negotiators 
liked the other party, the stronger the counterpart preference. Further, liking significantly 
mediated the relation between past outcomes and counterpart preferences. While entirely 
correlational in nature, these results are consistent with the idea that the quality of past 
interactions influences counterpart preferences through the influence of a gut feeling of liking the 
counterpart.  
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As is true for all heuristics, choosing based on the favorability of past agreements can 
lead to systematic biases (Gilovich et al, 2002). Consider the potential problems of a “win-stay, 
lose-change” strategy, in which a negotiator decides to negotiate again with a counterpart if the 
past negotiation turned out well, but rejects the counterpart if the past outcome was unfavorable. 
First, there may be important differences between the past negotiation situation and a future 
negotiation situation. Because of these differences, a counterpart who provided a favorable 
outcome in the past may not be the best match for a future negotiation. Second, the gain derived 
from a past negotiated agreement provides at best an imperfect cue to judge the value of a 
counterpart. Specifically, the reason for the favorable outcome achieved in a past negotiation 
may not have lied as much in the characteristics of the counterpart as in the negotiation situation. 
For example, a good outcome could have been achieved because of a wide bargaining zone, i.e., 
a large pie to distribute between the negotiators. A negotiation with the same counterpart with a 
narrower bargaining zone would likely have resulted in a much less favorable outcome, while at 
the same time being more contentious and unpleasant.  
I predict that negotiators’ counterpart preferences will fail to take situational factors, such 
as the difficulty of a negotiation, adequately into account. Negotiators’ counterpart preferences 
may be negatively affected by an unfavorable outcome even when this outcome is due to the 
situational constraint of a narrow bargaining zone, rather than the other party. This prediction is 
consistent with research on the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977; Nisbett & Ross, 1980), 
or the tendency to interpret the behavior of other people in terms of personality characteristics 
rather than characteristics of the situation. More recently, Morris, Larrick, & Su (1999) provided 
evidence for this tendency among negotiators by showing that negotiators made personality-trait 
attributions for behaviors caused by a situational factor. Specifically, they found that negotiators 
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ascribed more negative personality characteristics, such as lower agreeableness, when the 
negotiation situation was difficult than when it was easy.   
Building on this work, I predict that counterpart preferences will be influenced by 
(irrelevant) situational factors. Specifically, I expect that negotiators who performed a difficult 
negotiation (i.e., a negotiation in which it is difficult to achieve a favorable outcome because of a 
narrow bargaining zone) will have less favorable subsequent counterpart preferences than 
negotiators who interacted under more favorable conditions (i.e., a negotiation with a wide 
bargaining zone). Stated differently, I expect the influence of gain derived from a negotiated 
agreement to hold even when the gain is unrelated to the quality of the counterpart but is 
determined by the difficulty of the negotiation situation. Similar to Study 1, I expect this effect of 
negotiation difficulty on counterpart preferences to be mediated through liking of the other party: 
A difficult negotiation situation reduces interpersonal attraction towards the counterpart, which 
then leads to reduced counterpart preference. 
Hypothesis 4: Negotiation difficulty affects negotiation counterpart preference such that 
the more difficult a past negotiation the less favorable the preference to negotiate with 
the counterpart again in a future negotiation. 
Hypothesis 5: Liking mediates the effect of negotiation difficulty on preference to 
negotiate with the counterpart again in a future negotiation. 
Study 2 
Method 
Overview, Design, Procedure, and Participants 
In this laboratory experiment, participants performed a distributive, zero-sum negotiation 
simulation over a coffee supply contract. The negotiators’ goal was to maximize their bonuses 
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and this could be done by claiming as much as possible of the bargaining zone. For the seller, 
this meant maximizing the sale price of the coffee, and for the buyer it meant minimizing the 
price. The study manipulated one factor, negotiation difficulty, between-dyads across two levels 
(easy vs. difficult) by varying the width of the bargaining zone. About half the dyads had a 
relatively wide bargaining zone, which made it easy for the negotiators to receive a large bonus, 
whereas the other half had a relatively narrow bargaining zone, which made it difficult to reach 
an agreement that was better than the parties’ reservation prices, let alone receive a large bonus. 
Participants were randomly assigned to dyads, roles (buyer or seller), and experimental condition 
(difficult or easy negotiation) and were given 30 minutes to complete the negotiation exercise. 
They were encouraged to take the exercise seriously. Upon completion of the exercise the 
negotiators together filled out an agreement form on which they calculated the bonus they had 
achieved. Then, they completed by themselves a post-negotiation questionnaire measuring 
interpersonal liking and negotiation counterpart preferences.  
Thirty-six undergraduate students at a US university participated for course credit.  
Materials, Manipulation, and Measures 
  Negotiation. The exercise was a negotiation between a salesperson for a coffee distributor 
and a hotel purchasing agent. Negotiators were given information about their reservation prices 
as well as the bonus they would get from their company depending on the agreement reached. In 
the easy negotiation condition, buyers were told they would receive $50 bonus for each cent the 
settlement was below $3.75 per pound (their reservation price) and sellers were told they would 
receive $50 bonus for each cent the settlement was above $3.15 per pound (their reservation 
price). This bonus was only hypothetical. The bargaining zone was $.60 and the total bonus to be 
distributed between the two negotiators was $3000. In the difficult negotiation condition 
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condition, buyers received $50 bonus for each cent the settlement was below $3.75 per pound, 
and sellers received $50 bonus for each cent the settlement was above $3.65. The bargaining 
zone was only $.10 and the total bonus to be distributed was $500. This manipulation ensured 
that the favorability of agreement, as measured by the bonus earned, was considerably higher in 
the easy negotiation condition.  
  Negotiation counterpart preference. The same two items as in Study 1 were used to 
measure negotiators’ preferences to negotiate again with the other party in future negotiations. 
The two measures were again combined into an index by averaging, r = .69, α = .81. 
  Interpersonal liking. Using the same seven-point scale as in Study 1, a second item was 
added to measure negotiators’ interpersonal liking of the counterpart to ensure greater reliability. 
The first item was as in Study 1. The second item read: “I specifically enjoyed negotiating with 
this counterpart.” The items were averaged, r = .82, α = .90. 
Results 
I first examined whether scores at the individual level were dependent on which dyad 
negotiators were randomly assigned to, following the procedure described in Kashy and Kenny 
(2000). The analyses revealed no influence of dyad on any dependent variables (all p > .9). 
Based on these results, I analyzed the data at the individual level.  
Manipulation Check 
To test whether the experimental manipulation of negotiation difficulty was successful, I 
examined how exhausting the negotiation was (on a 7-point Likert scale as described above). As 
expected, the negotiation was experienced as significantly more exhausting in the difficult 
negotiation condition (M = 3.30) than in the easy negotiation condition (M = 2.19), F(1, 34) = 
5.61, p < .05.  
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Negotiation Difficulty and Negotiation Counterpart Preferences 
To test for the predicted effect of negotiation difficulty on counterpart preferences I 
conducted an ANCOVA with negotiation difficulty as between-subjects factor and role as 
covariate. Results showed that preference to negotiate with the counterpart in the future was 
significantly less favorable when the past negotiation situation had been difficult (M = 4.95, SD 
= 1.56) than when it had been easy (M = 5.94, SD = .89), F(1, 33) = 4.92, p < .05. This result is 
consistent with Hypothesis 4. The covariate was not significant, F = .14, ns.  
The Role of Interpersonal Liking 
I next examined the role of interpersonal liking as a mediator of the effect of negotiation 
difficulty on negotiation counterpart preferences (cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, replicating 
the results of Study 1 and consistent with Hypothesis 2, liking predicted counterpart preferences, 
r = .83 (see Table 2 for means, standard deviations, and correlations). The more negotiators liked 
their counterparts based on the past negotiation experience, the more did they want to negotiate 
with them again. Second, negotiation difficulty affected liking, r = .36. Negotiators liked their 
counterparts more in the easy negotiation condition than in the difficult negotiation condition. 
Third, when predicting negotiation counterpart preferences simultaneously from negotiation 
difficulty and liking, the latter continued to be a significant predictor, β = .81, t(34) = 7.88, p < 
.001, but the former became insignificant, β = .07, t(34) = .69, ns. A Sobel (1982) test showed 
that the indirect, or mediational, path from negotiation difficulty through liking to counterpart 
preference was significant (z = 2.23, p < .05). Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 5, liking 
mediated the effect of negotiation difficulty on negotiation counterpart preferences.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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Discussion 
  Study 2 examined the effect of a situational factor, the difficulty of the negotiation 
situation (i.e., the difficulty to achieve a good outcome because of size of the bargaining zone), 
on subsequent negotiation counterpart preferences. As predicted, individuals’ preference to 
negotiate with the other party again in the future was lower when the past negotiation situation 
was difficult (i.e., the bargaining zone was narrow) than when the situation was easy (i.e., the 
bargaining zone was wide). In addition, a difficult negotiation situation led negotiators to like 
their counterparts less. This reduced liking was associated with lower counterpart preferences. 
Importantly, statistical analyses suggest that liking mediated the effect of negotiation difficulty 
on counterpart preferences.  
These findings are consistent with research on individuals’ tendency to make personal 
attributions towards others even for events and outcomes that are, in fact, due to characteristics 
of the situation (Ross, 1977). In the present context, the negative impact of this situational effect 
is possibly amplified as it works both ways: Both negotiators are likely to attribute a 
dissatisfying outcome that resulted from a difficult negotiation situation to the other party. The 
results suggest that such interpretations of past events can place a significant burden on the 
relation between the two negotiators and create a formidable obstacle for future interactions that 
very well could have been beneficial for both parties (cf. Morris et al, 1999).  
The potential negative consequences of the erroneous attribution of a difficult negotiation 
situation to the counterpart naturally raise the important question of how resistant this effect is 
against efforts at debiasing. The effect of negotiation difficulty on counterpart preferences might 
have been due to a significant degree to negotiators’ lack of awareness about the nature of the 
negotiation situation they faced. Thus, Study 3 examined whether it is possible to weaken, or 
Past Negotiations and Counterpart Preferences    
 
17
even eradicate completely, the influence of past negotiation difficulty on counterpart preferences. 
The study provided negotiators with either relevant or irrelevant information about the 
negotiation situation after the negotiation. To test the effect of this information, negotiation 
counterpart preferences were assessed twice: one time after the negotiation but before the 
additional information was given and a second time after the information was provided. The 
theoretical argument suggests a three-way interaction between the difficulty of the negotiation, 
the relevance of the information, and the measurement (i.e., before or after the information was 
received). Specifically, one would expect a significant effect of negotiation difficulty on 
negotiation counterpart preferences before the information was given at the first measurement 
(consistent with Hypothesis 4 and replicating the results of Study 2) and also after the irrelevant 
information was given at the second measurement. However, this effect of negotiation difficulty 
should weaken or even entirely disappear after negotiators received additional relevant 
information. This prediction is captured in the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6: Negotiation difficulty, information, and measurement interact to affect 
negotiation counterpart preference. Specifically, the effect of negotiation difficulty on 
counterpart preference is reduced only after additional relevant information about the 
negotiation situation is received.  
Study 3 
Method 
Overview, Design, Procedure, and Participants 
Study 3 was designed to test Hypothesis 6. Participants first performed the same 
distributive, zero-sum negotiation simulation over a coffee supply contract for a hotel as in Study 
2. The study manipulated three factors: negotiation difficulty, information, and measurement. 
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Negotiation difficulty was manipulated between-dyads across two levels (easy vs. difficult) by 
varying the width of the bargaining zone as in Study 2. Information was also manipulated 
between-dyads across two levels by either providing relevant information about the difficulty of 
the negotiation situation (e.g., the width of the bargaining zone) or irrelevant information not 
speaking to the difficulty of the negotiation situation. Further, in a within-subjects manipulation 
of measurement, negotiation counterpart preferences were measured twice after the negotiation: 
first, directly after the negotiation; second, after negotiators read the additional (relevant or 
irrelevant) information.  
Participants were given 30 minutes to complete the negotiation exercise. Participants 
were encouraged to take the task seriously. Upon completion of the first simulation the 
negotiators together filled out an agreement form on which they calculated the bonus they had 
achieved. Then, they completed by themselves a post-negotiation questionnaire measuring 
negotiation counterpart preference and interpersonal liking. After that, they were given a sheet 
with additional information about the negotiation and were asked to fill out another post-
negotiation questionnaire measuring negotiation counterpart preference for the second time.  
Hundred-forty-eight undergraduate business students participated in exchange for course 
credit.  
Materials, Manipulations, and Measures 
The negotiation simulation and manipulation of negotiation difficulty were the same as in 
Study 2. After having filled out the first post-negotiation questionnaire, all participants received 
additional information about the negotiation on another sheet of paper. Specifically, participants 
in the relevant information condition received the following information (with differences 
between the two negotiation difficulty conditions in parentheses):  
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You just engaged in a negotiation with a bargaining zone of [10/60] cents. The seller 
received a bonus for a selling price above [$3.65/$3.15] per pound and the buyer received 
a bonus for a buying price below $3.75 per pound.  
Given a bargaining zone of [10/60] cents, the combined bonus for both negotiators 
was [$500/$3000]. If you had split the bargaining zone equally between the two of you 
(i.e., settled at [$3.70/$3.45]), both negotiators would have received a [$250/$1500] 
bonus. The higher the bonus you received, the lower the bonus your counterpart received, 
and the larger bonus your counterpart received, the lower was your bonus.     
Negotiators were then asked to restate the bonus they earned as well as indicate the bonus they 
would have received given an equal split.  
Participants in the irrelevant information condition received the following information, 
regardless of negotiation difficulty condition: 
You just engaged in a negotiation about a coffee contract. The seller received a bonus 
for achieving a high selling price and the buyer received a bonus for buying at a low 
price. The bargaining zone was positive, that is, it was possible to reach an agreement. 
Negotiations similar to this simulation occur frequently in the real world. 
Negotiators were then asked to restate the bonus they earned.  
Next, participants in all conditions then responded to the second negotiation counterpart 
preference measure. Before doing so they were told that they should feel free to give the same 
answers as before or to change them, whatever they liked. At both times, negotiator counterpart 
preferences were measured with the following item on a 7-point Likert scale (7: strongly agree, 
1: strongly disagree): “I would like to negotiate again with my counterpart in a negotiation like 
this but for real outcomes”.  
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Results and Discussion 
I first examined whether scores at the individual level were dependent on which dyad 
negotiators were randomly assigned to. The analyses revealed no significant influence of dyad on 
counterpart preference in the first measurement (p = .86) or the second measurement (p = .35). 
As suggested in Kashy and Kenny (2000), the data were thus analyzed at the individual level.   
Manipulation Check 
To test whether the manipulation of negotiation difficulty was successful, perceptions of 
negotiation difficulty were assessed (“I found this negotiation exercise to be difficult”; on a 7-
point Likert scale). As expected, the negotiation was experienced as significantly more difficult 
in the difficult negotiation condition (M = 3.46) than in the easy negotiation condition (M = 
3.00), F(1, 147) = 4.48, p < .05.  
Debiasing Effect of Relevant Information  
To test Hypothesis 6, I conducted a mixed-measures ANOVA with negotiation difficulty 
and information as between-subjects factors and measurement as within-subjects factor. As 
predicted, this analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction between negotiation 
difficulty, information, and measurement, F(1, 143) = 4.23, p < .05. A closer look at the form of 
the interaction showed that the interaction was consistent with Hypothesis 6 (see Figure 1).  
Replicating the results of Study 2 and in further support of Hypothesis 4, negotiation 
difficulty significantly affected counterpart preferences before additional information about the 
negotiation situation was received (first measurement), F(1, 143) = 6.72, p = .01. As expected, 
before any information was received, negotiators in the difficult negotiation condition showed a 
lower preference to negotiate with their counterpart again (M = 4.82, SD = 1.47) than those in the 
easy negotiation condition (M = 5.38, SD = 1.28). Negotiation difficulty continued to affect 
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counterpart preferences at the second measurement when the information provided before the 
measurement was irrelevant, F(1,84) = 2.83, p < .05, one-tailed. As expected, counterpart 
preferences were lower when the negotiation was difficult (M = 4.9, SD = 1.32) than when it was 
easy (M = 5.34, SD = 1.08).  
However, when relevant information about the difficulty of the negotiation situation was 
given before the second measurement, the difference in counterpart preferences disappeared, 
F(1, 60) = .14, ns, and negotiators had similarly strong preferences to negotiate with their 
counterpart again in both the difficult (M = 5.50, SD = 1.50) and the easy negotiation condition 
(M = 5.63, SD = 1.33). Further analyses revealed that the assimilation of counterpart preferences 
was the result of ratings improving in the difficult negotiation condition when relevant 
information was given. Specifically, counterpart preferences in the difficult negotiation condition 
at the second measurement were higher when relevant (M = 5.50, SD = 1.50) rather than 
irrelevant information (M = 4.9, SD = 1.32) was received prior to measurement, F(1, 72) = 3.27, 
p < .05, one-tailed. No such difference was found in the easy negotiation condition, F(1, 72) = 
1.09, ns (relevant information, M  = 5.63, SD = 1.33, irrelevant information, M = 5.34, SD = 
1.08). Further, counterpart preferences significantly improved from the first assessment (M = 
4.78, SD = 1.68) to the second assessment (M = 5.50, SD = 1.50) only when relevant information 
was received between the measurements and the negotiation situation was difficult, F(1, 31) = 
9.41, p < .01. When the negotiation situation was easy, no significant change occurred between 
the first measurement (M = 5.59, SD = 1.27) and the second measurement (M = 5.69, SD = 1.31), 
F(1, 28) = .37, ns. Similarly, when the information provided was irrelevant, counterpart 
preferences did not improve. This was the case when the negotiation situation was difficult (first 
measurement, M = 4.86, SD = 1.30, second measurement, M = 4.9, SD = 1.32), F(1, 41) = .22, 
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ns, and when the negotiation was easy (first measurement, M = 5.25, SD = 1.28, second 
measurement, M = 5.34, SD = 1.08), F(1, 43) = .49, ns. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
General Discussion 
Before negotiations can start, negotiators need to decide with whom to negotiate. Such 
negotiation counterpart decisions can have a significant impact on negotiation success (Raiffa, 
2002; Reb, 2007; Tenbrunsel et al, 1999). Unfortunately, little research has addressed such 
negotiation counterpart decisions. Three studies examined the influence of past negotiations on 
subsequent negotiation counterpart preferences. Study 1 found that the more favorable a past 
negotiated agreement the stronger the preference to negotiate with the counterpart again in the 
future. Moreover, this relation was mediated through liking of the counterpart: the better the past 
outcome, the more liked was the counterpart; and the higher the liking, the stronger the 
preference to negotiate with the counterpart again in the future. Study 2 manipulated how 
difficult it was to achieve a favorable outcome from the negotiation and found a significant effect 
of this situational factor such that preference to negotiate with the counterpart again was lower 
when the negotiation was difficult. Similar to Study 1, this effect was mediated through liking of 
the counterpart. Study 2 suggests that negotiators misattribute situational determinants of 
negotiation outcomes to the counterpart, thus unduly biasing negotiation counterpart preferences. 
Study 3 examined the possibility of debiasing counterpart preferences by providing relevant 
information about the negotiation situation. Replicating the results of Study 2, results showed 
that negotiation difficulty negatively affected counterpart preferences before any information 
was given and also after irrelevant information was given. However, once negotiators received 
relevant information on the negotiation situation, the effect of negotiation difficulty on 
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counterpart preferences disappeared. Thus, Study 3 showed a way in which negotiation 
counterpart preferences can be protected from a misattribution bias of situational factors to 
personal characteristics of the counterpart. The present research has several noteworthy 
implications.  
Past Negotiation Experiences and Negotiation Counterpart Preferences 
One might expect negotiators to base their counterpart decisions on a forward-looking 
analysis of the expected utilities of negotiating with their potential counterparts. However, 
research on decision making and negotiation suggests that negotiators will be guided by simple 
heuristics that use limited information to arrive at a relatively fast and cognitively less 
demanding counterpart evaluation (Gilovich et al, 2002; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Zajonc, 
1980). Based on this research, I predicted that negotiators’ counterpart preferences would be 
significantly influenced by past negotiation experience with the counterpart, as such past 
experience can serve as a convenient and easily available cue to evaluate a counterpart. This 
prediction was confirmed in several studies.  
The results of Study 1 suggest that the more economic gain is derived from a negotiated 
agreement, the more favorable are preferences to negotiate with the counterpart again in the 
future. Study 1 focused on such an “objective” measure of the outcome of a negotiation partly 
because it is of high importance in most negotiations and partly because it is a relatively salient 
cue that negotiators can easily use to evaluate a counterpart. However, future research should 
examine the role of other types of negotiation outcomes on subsequent counterpart preferences. 
First, this research could examine the influence of subjective measures, such as outcome 
satisfaction. Past research has found that objective negotiation outcomes and subjective 
evaluations of these outcomes can diverge significantly (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 
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2002; Galinsky, Seiden, Kim, & Medvec, 2002). Thus, it would be interesting to test whether the 
results reported here replicate with subjective measures of negotiation outcomes.  
Second, the relation between other aspects of the negotiation experience and counterpart 
preferences should be examined. Although most negotiation research focuses on own 
instrumental or economic outcomes, negotiators also care about other aspects of a negotiation 
(Greenhalgh, 1987; Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004). For example, one might expect the quality 
of, or satisfaction with, the negotiation process to affect counterpart preferences. In other words, 
given the same economic value of the agreement, one might expect counterpart preferences to be 
higher when the counterpart used a fair negotiation process rather than an unfair one. Negotiation 
process variables that could be examined include whether the other party was polite, fair, 
cooperative, and respectful.  
Studies 2 and 3 suggest that counterpart preferences may be unduly influenced by 
situational determinants of the negotiation experience. In particular, when it was difficult to 
reach a favorable outcome from the negotiated agreement due to a narrow bargaining zone, 
preference to negotiate with the other party again in the future was significantly lower than when 
it was easy to reach a favorable agreement (cf. Morris et al, 1999). Study 3 also showed a way to 
debias counterpart preferences: When negotiators received relevant – but not when they received 
irrelevant – information, the effect of negotiation difficulty on preferences disappeared. 
One can wonder to what extent variables such as process satisfaction are influenced by 
situational factors rather than characteristics of the counterpart and to what extent negotiators are 
able to accurately distinguish between these two. Just as in the present studies, negotiators might 
tend to attribute detrimental situational influences to the other party. One interesting question is 
whether beneficial situational influences also tend to be attributed incorrectly to the counterpart. 
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The results of Study 3 suggest that it is the negative influence of a difficult situation that carries 
more weight. This study found that the debiasing information only improved counterpart 
preferences in the difficult negotiation situation condition; preferences in the easy negotiation 
condition remained unchanged. Future research could attempt to tease apart more carefully the 
influence of positive and negative situational factors on counterpart evaluations.  
Interpersonal Liking and Negotiation Counterpart Preferences 
The present studies suggest that liking of another party leads to a stronger preference to 
negotiate with that party. In addition, liking seems to play an important role as a mediating 
variable through which other, more distal variables influence negotiation counterpart 
preferences. This finding is consistent with research that shows liking to serve as a simple and 
quick heuristic to form preferences (Zajonc, 1980). Future research could examine more fully the 
implications of the relation between liking and negotiation counterpart preferences. In particular, 
it may be interesting to examine how liking-based counterpart preference may lead negotiators 
astray. For example, research suggests that familiarity increases liking (Zajonc, 1968; Brockner 
& Swap, 1976). Thus, one might expect negotiators to prefer to negotiate with familiar others, 
such as friends and family. Past research has been inconclusive about whether negotiations with 
close others lead to superior or inferior outcomes than negotiations with strangers (Valley, Neale, 
& Mannix, 1994). Certainly, there is a danger that the conflict inherent in negotiations burdens 
the relationship. Thus, liking may draw individuals to negotiate with close others even though 
the negotiation may negatively effect the relationship between the parties.  
Also, consider the implications of the finding that similarity leads to liking (Byrne, 1971; 
Byrne & Griffitt, 1973). Because negotiators can reach integrative agreements by trading off 
their differences in values, preferences, and expectations, more similar negotiators are likely to 
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achieve lower outcomes because of a lack of trade off possibilities (Raiffa, 2002). Also, consider 
that people tend to like physically attractive individuals more (Berscheid & Walster, 1974) and, 
thus, may prefer to negotiate with physically attractive counterparts. However, because 
physically attractive individuals tend to perform better in social interactions such as negotiations 
(Hosoda, Stone-Romero, & Coats, 2003), choosing such a counterpart might actually lead to less 
favorable outcomes. In other words, negotiators might actually be better off choosing a 
physically unattractive counterpart, even though they are likely to do the opposite. 
Other Influences on Negotiation Counterpart Decisions 
  The present studies focused on the influence of past negotiations on counterpart 
preferences, and in particular, the role of economic gain, negotiation difficulty, and liking. Future 
research could examine additional variables that might influence negotiation counterpart 
decisions. For example, in addition to liking, other variables relating to the relationship between 
the two negotiators might play an important role in shaping preferences. Thus, future research 
could examine the role of trust, power, and status in order to be able to paint a more detailed 
picture of the formation of negotiation counterpart preferences.  
More broadly, future studies could examine variables not related to past negotiation 
experiences with the counterpart. Negotiators will often not have first-hand negotiation 
experience with most of the potential counterparts. How do negotiators select their counterparts 
in such situations? One possibility is that they rely on information provided by the potential 
counterparts, including information about their resources, negotiation style, etc. Another 
possibility is that they use information from other sources about counterparts’ reputation, status, 
power, or personality. Yet another possibility is that they choose the most convenient, easily 
available counterpart in an effort to keep transaction costs low. Quite likely, which strategy is 
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chosen will depend on such factors as the ease of availability of the different pieces of 
information as well as their perceived reliability. As these examples illustrate, there are a number 
of interesting research questions in search for answers.  
Improving Negotiation Counterpart Decisions 
From a more applied perspective, more research should be conducted on ways to improve 
counterpart decisions. The results of Study 3 suggest, for example, that the influence on 
counterpart preferences of irrelevant situational factors, such as the difficulty of the negotiation 
situation, can be eliminated by providing relevant information about the negotiation situation. Of 
course, in real negotiations such information will often not be available. Clearly, more research 
is needed on other ways to “debias” negotiators from the influence of situational characteristics 
on counterpart preferences, and also, more generally, on how to help negotiators make better 
counterpart decisions. As one direction, Barry and Oliver (1996) propose that a negative 
affective state will lead negotiators to make more strategic, rational counterpart decisions. 
Perhaps less emotionally unpleasant, bringing the importance of selecting the right counterpart to 
negotiators’ awareness could be a simple, yet effective, way to improve counterpart decisions. 
Limitations 
Very little research has examined negotiation counterpart decisions. As such one must be 
careful not to draw any premature conclusions on the basis of the present studies. Some of the 
present results, such as the relation between liking and counterpart preferences and the effect of 
negotiation difficulty on counterpart preferences, were found in two studies, which is reassuring 
to some extent. However, several limitations of the present research need to be kept in mind. 
First, we do not know how well the present findings generalize to other types of negotiators and 
negotiations. The present study participants were relatively inexperienced in negotiating. Would 
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more experienced negotiators be influenced just as much by interpersonal liking, or would their 
approach to selecting counterparts be more “strategic” and analytical?  
Also, in all three studies negotiators performed simulated, rather than real, negotiations 
with hypothetical, rather than real outcomes. Negotiators were encouraged to take the task 
seriously in order to make the negotiations more engaging. Also, the large majority of 
participants used most of the available time for the negotiation, suggesting they took the task 
seriously. In addition, the highly controlled environment created in the laboratory was conducive 
to the internal validity of the studies. Nevertheless, laboratory studies should be complemented 
by field research of negotiation counterpart decisions in the “real world.” 
Further, the present studies assessed counterpart preferences towards one party only, 
namely, the counterpart of the negotiation just completed. Only in Study 3 did negotiators expect 
to negotiate again and believed that their counterpart preferences would influence with whom 
they would be paired for the second negotiation. However, in the present studies negotiators did 
not actually choose their preferred counterpart among a set of potential counterparts. While our 
design was chosen so as to get at the influence of past negotiations on subsequent counterpart 
preferences, future research should also examine choices among a pool of potential counterparts. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that negotiators do not always have a choice with 
whom to negotiate. Examples include negotiations that take place in ongoing relationships 
between employee and supervisor, wife and husband, or partners in a joint venture. In other 
cases, the pool of available counterparts will be large, such as in the case of a car buyer who can 
choose from among a huge number of other parties. Sometimes, a counterpart choice may exist 
even when it is not obvious at first. For example, a choice of counterpart may be available in 
negotiations by agents for principals (Bazerman, Neale, Valley, Zajac, & Kim, 1992). Even 
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though the negotiation counterpart is fixed at the level of the principal (e.g., the partner in a joint 
venture), there may nevertheless be some choice at the level of the agents who perform the actual 
negotiating. Further, a counterpart choice may be opened up through a consideration of time 
frame. The idea here is that “physically” the same counterpart may negotiate differently at 
different times. For example, if employees expect their supervisors’ negotiation behavior to be 
different, and more favorable for them, on a Friday than on a Monday, they can deliberately 
decide to negotiate with their “Friday-bosses” and avoid negotiating with their “Monday-
bosses”.  
Conclusion 
Mannix (2003) pointed out the need for new directions to give fresh impetus to the field 
of negotiation research. Most negotiation research starts with the negotiators sitting at the 
“bargaining table”. Moreover, it is the researchers who typically assign negotiators to their 
counterparts rather than the negotiators matching up with each other by themselves. It is perhaps 
partly due to the restricting influence of this “standard methodology” that past research has 
largely ignored negotiation counterpart decisions. By highlighting the role of this neglected 
aspect of negotiations, I hope that the present studies contribute to a widening of our fields’ view 
of the negotiation process and provide impetus for more research on negotiation counterpart 
decisions. In addition to the theoretical contributions, there seems to be substantial practical 
value of such research given the importance that is attributed to negotiation preparation in 
general (e.g., Lewicki et al, 2003) and negotiation counterpart decisions in particular (Raiffa, 
2002; Tenbrunsel et al, 1999) for achieving successful negotiations. Research on negotiation 
counterpart decisions is only at its beginning, but, I believe, holds substantial promise to increase 
our understanding of negotiation behavior as well as to help negotiators achieve better outcomes.  
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Footnotes 
1  A similar argument could be made for the quality of the negotiation process: if the past 
process was good (e.g., procedurally and interactionally fair), negotiate with the counterpart 
again; if it was bad, search for a new counterpart. Indeed, research on organizational justice has 
highlighted the important role of process in people’s evaluations (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988). I 
will take up this issue again in the General Discussion section. 
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations (Study 1) 
 M SD 1 2 3 
1. Economic gain 5231 2110 --   
2. Interpersonal liking 5.51 .96 .26* --  
3. Negotiation counterpart preference  5.35 1.15 .32** .51*** (.66) 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
Notes. Interpersonal liking and negotiation counterpart preference were assessed on a 7-point 
Likert-scale (1-7). 
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Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations (Study 2) 
 M SD 1 2 3 
1. Negotiation difficulty 1.56 .50 --   
2. Interpersonal liking 5.57 1.17 .36* (.92)  
3. Negotiation counterpart preference  5.39 1.38 .36* .83*** (.81) 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
Notes. Interpersonal liking and negotiation counterpart preference were assessed on a 7-point 
Likert-scale (1-7). 
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Figure 1: Interaction Effect between Negotiation Difficulty, Information, and Measurement on 
Negotiation Counterpart Preferences (Study 3) 
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